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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: DEFINING THE OFFENSES
WALTER GARY SHARP, SR.*
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is
of the greatest importance for the full realization of this
pledge....
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one of the greatest
documents impacting human rights since the Magna Carta.2 It was born
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., Part I, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
2. The Magna Carta was a charter granted by King John of England to the English
barons on June 15, 1215, and since considered the basis of English constitutional liber-
ties. . . . The Magna Carta contained the first detailed definition of the relationship be-
tween the king and the barons, guaranteed feudal rights, and regularized the judicial sys-
tem. . . . The Courts of Common Pleas were set permanently in Westminster, the
conduct of trials was simplified according to strict rules of procedure, and the penalties
for felonies were standardized. No one was to be condemned on rumor or suspicion, but
only on the evidence of credible witnesses. The historical basis for English civil liberties
is contained in the statement: "No freeman shall be taken and imprisoned or disseised or
exiled or in any way destroyed, nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, except by
the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." In other words, life, lib-
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out of the barbarity of two world wars and a reaffirmation of fundamen-
tal international human rights3 that recognized the "dignity and worth of
the human person and . .. the equal rights of men and women." 4
Sadly, however, we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of this historic doc-
ument on December 10, 19981 in the absence of a standing international
criminal court that can prosecute even the most egregious violations of
international human rights law.
Any international tribunal convened to prosecute persons suspected
of violations of international human rights law must comply with certain
minimum standards accepted by the international community.6 As dis-
cussed in Part II of this article, the sporadic international prosecutions
before World War I provide no acceptable standards, and the trials fol-
lowing World War I were unsuccessful. In contrast, the prosecutions that
followed World War II were generally successful, yet their fairness have
been questioned.7 The "international tribunal for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia"
since 19918 is the only contemporary tribunal that provides a model for
erty, and property were not to be taken from anyone without judgment of the person's
peers and only by process of the law of the land. . . . Although the Magna Carta may
be refuted by Parliament at any time and is therefore not legally inviolable, the rights es-
tablished under the charter have been given the force of law for seven centuries and have
secured a habitual recognition of validity. Magna Carta, MICROSOFT ENCARTA '95 (CD-
ROM Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1994).
3. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 776-93 (Bruno
Simma ed., 1994). This text provides an excellent, concise history of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. The UDHR is an implementation of the obligations of Member
States found in art. 55c of the Charter of the United Nations to promote "universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id. at 782. For a more detailed historical
account and commentary., see THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COM-
MENTARY (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992).
4. UDHR, supra note 1, pmbl.
5. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3,
at 1.
6. The Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights make no exceptions for international tribunals which prosecute violations of
human rights law.
7. See, e.g., LAWRENCE TAYLOR, A TRIAL OF GENERALS (1981).
8. See U.N.S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993). The official abbreviated title for this tri-
bunal is "The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia." I VIRGINIA
MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, at
xvii n.2 (1995).
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internationally accepted standards for prosecuting persons suspected of
violating international human rights law.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does, however, set forth
minimum guidelines for the rights of individuals during trial by national
courts and international tribunals. Articles 5 and 9 through 11 provide
that
Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ...
Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, de-
tention or exile.
Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a FAIR and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him.
Article 11. 1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees nec-
essary for his defence. 2. No one shall be held guilty of any pe-
nal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offence, under national or international
law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time
the penal offence was committed.9
I have emphasized certain phrases in these articles to highlight the
principle nullen crimen sine lege (there can be no crime without a law)
and to make the point that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
requires that crimes must be defined in detail. There is no protection
against arbitrary arrest, no guarantee of a fair hearing, no standard
against which to prove one guilty according to law, no standard against
which to defend oneself, and no certainty as to the nature of a crime at
any given time if the elements of the offenses are not detailed in the ju-
risdictional documents of an international tribunal.
A standing international criminal court is vital to the enforcement of
international human rights. Part II of this article will briefly survey the
evolution of international criminal enforcement mechanisms for violations
of international human rights law - from the fifteenth century to the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established in
1993. Part III will then discuss in detail the proposed Definition of Of-
9. UDHR, supra note 1, arts. 5, 9-11 [emphasis added].
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fenses that I prepared for the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia. The final part briefly discusses the ongoing initiative for
a standing international criminal court, and concludes that the proposed
Definition of Offenses attached should be used as a guide for drafting el-
ements of crimes for the standing international criminal court.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Existing enforcement of human rights violations occurs primarily at
three levels: by the national courts of the state concerned, formal and in-
formal diplomatic pressure by states upon each other, and civil remedies
applied by international organizations against states.'0 Criminal sanctions
for violations of international human rights law, however, first began as
war crimes prosecutions. 1 The first recorded international war crimes
prosecution was the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 by a tribunal
of twenty-eight judges from the allied States of the Holy Roman
Empire. 12
Prior to World War I, war crimes trials reflected the international
community's competence to prosecute those suspected of violating the
laws and customs of war, but such prosecutions were sporadic and failed
to form a body of precedent. 13 The discretion to prosecute suspected war
criminals was left to the individual States involved in a conflict, and
prosecution depended upon national legislation.' 4 The trials following
World War I were the first major international effort to punish war
crimes.' 5 These trials are referred to as the Leipzig trials, and were gen-
erally unsuccessful.1 6
10. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 719-21 (John Norton Moore et a]. eds., 1990).
11. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 147-51 (1992).
12. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Prosecution of International Crimes and the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: EN-
FORCEMENT 3, 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987). During his trial in Breisach, Germany,
Peter von Hagenbach was found guilty of murder, rape, perjury, and other crimes
"against the law of God and man" in the execution of a military occupation, was
stripped of his knighthood, and put to death. Id.
13. COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 583 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter 1949 Ge-
neva Convention No. IV COMMENTARY]; BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 151.
14. 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 584.
15. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 11 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter LAWS OF WAR].
16. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-161-2, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOLUME II, at 222 (1962)
[hereinafter DA PAM. 27-161-2]. The 1919 Versailles "Treaty of Peace Between the Al-
lied and Associated Powers and Germany" obligated Germany to turn over suspected war
[Vol. 23
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In 1942, the Allies signed, in London, a declaration that the punish-
ment of war crimes was a principal goal of the Allies. 7 To specifically
avoid a repeat of the Leipzig trials, the Allies signed the Moscow Decla-
ration of October 30, 1943, that stated suspected war criminals would be
tried "by the people and at the spot where the crime was committed.""
The Moscow Declaration also stated that crimes with no specific geo-
graphic setting would be the subject of a later joint decision. 9 On August
8, 1945, an agreement 20 was signed by the Allies establishing an Interna-
tional Military Tribunal to try Germans whose alleged crimes had no si-
tus. 2' The only international prosecutions in the Far East were based on
the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, issued by the United States,
United Kingdom, and China.22
Individual criminal responsibility for violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war is an undisputed part of contemporary customary interna-
tional law. 23 Criminal responsibility can extend to individual combatants,
government officials, and Heads of State.24 Furthermore, it is a recog-
criminals to the Allies for trial. Germany, however, refused the Allied extradition request
for 896 suspected German war criminals, and instead, chose forty-five accused to be tried
by the Criminal Senate of the Imperial Court of Justice of Germany. Of these forty-five,
only twelve were tried - six of these twelve were acquitted, and the other six received
light sentences. Id. at 221-22.
17. LAWS OF WAR, supra note 15, at 11.
18. DA PAM. 27-161-2, supra note 16, at 222.
19. Id.
20. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter 1945
London Agreement], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 911 (Dietrich Schin-
dler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS].
21. DA PAM. 27-161-2, supra note 16, at 223-4. Annexed to the 1945 London
Agreement was the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1545, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 [hereinafter 1945 Charter of the IMT], reprinted in LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 20, at 913. The International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg conducted one trial of twenty-four German defendants. Of these twenty-four defend-
ants, nineteen were convicted of at least one of the four counts alleged, three were found
not guilty, one defendant committed suicide before trial, and one was not tried because of
old age. DA PAM. 27-161-2, supra note 16, at 224-26.
22. DA PAM. 27-161-2, supra note 16, at 233. On April 3, 1946, the Allied Far
Eastern Advisory Committee issued a policy decision upon which twenty-five defendants
were tried and convicted. Id. at 234.
23. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, princ. I, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
374 [hereinafter 1950 Nuremberg Principles], reprinted in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 20, at 923; LAWS OF WAR, supra note 15, at 12.
24. 1950 Nuremberg Principles, supra note 23, princs. III-IV, reprinted in LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 20, at 924.
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nized principle of international law that "[1]eaders, organizers, instigators,
and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a com-
mon plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes [crimes
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity] are responsible
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan."' 25 Since
war crimes are universal crimes, suspected war criminals may be prose-
cuted by any State or by an international tribunal. 26 States have, however,
avoided war crimes trials of enemy personnel for conflicts since World
War 1127 despite the serious war crimes that were committed during a
number of international armed conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, Pales-
tine, Pakistan-Bangladesh-India, Cyprus, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf.28
The war in the former Yugoslavia began in March of 1992.29 In Oc-
tober of 1992, alarmed at the continuing reports of widespread violations
of international humanitarian law, mass killings, and ethnical cleansing,
the Security Council requested the United Nations Secretary-General to
establish a Commission of Experts to report on the "evidence of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia." 30
After an interim report of the Commission of Experts in February of
1993 that recommended the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal,
the Security Council decided that an international tribunal shall be estab-
lished and requested the Secretary-General to make a report on all mat-
ters related to the creation of such an ad hoc tribunal.31
The Secretary-General completed his report, which contained a pro-
posed "Statute of the International Tribunal," on May 3, 1993.32 Acting
25. Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Sept.
30, 1946, 22 T.M.W.C. 411, extracts reprinted in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 15, at 155.
26. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (3d ed. 1984).
27. FRITs KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 69 (2d ed. 1991); OF-
FICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEP'T OF NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 11 S6.2.5.2-S6.2.5.3
(1989).
28. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 232.
29. Patricia Forestier, Psychiatric Genocide! How the Barbarities of 'Ethnic Cleans-
ing' Were Spawned by Psychiatry, FREEDOM, -May 1993, at 6.
30. U.N.S.C.Res. 780 (Oct. 6, 1992).
31. U.N.S.C.Res. 808 (Feb. 22, 1993). The final report of the Commission of Ex-
perts was completed in May of 1994. After 18 months of studies and on-site investiga-
tions, the Commission of Experts concluded that "grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions and other violations of international humanitarian law have been committed . . .
on a large scale, and were particularly brutal and ferocious in their execution." Letter
dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
32. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
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under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
the Security Council approved the report of the Secretary-General,
adopted his proposed Statute, and established "an international tribunal
for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined
by the Security Council upon the restoration of peace." 33 Articles 2
through 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal grants the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia the power to prose-
cute persons suspected of grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide,
or crimes against humanity.3 4 The Statute does not, however, detail the
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
33. U.N.S.C.Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
34. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), Annex (Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal). Specifically, article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal pro-
vides that:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons commit-
ting or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property pro-
tected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) willful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a
hostile power;
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair
and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
Article 3 of the Statute of the International Tribunal provides that:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating
the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, vil-
lages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated
to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monu-
ments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
1999]
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elements of the offenses.
Il. PROPOSED DEFINITION OF OFFENSES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The proposed Definition of Offenses attached to this article deline-
ates the elements of the crimes authorized by Articles 2 through 5 of the
Statute of the International Tribunal. This proposal was drafted by this
author in February 1994 at the request of Colonel James P. Terry, U.S.
Marine Corps, then Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It was intended to serve as an official submission of the United
States, after interagency coordination and Department of State approval,
to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The in-
teragency coordination process began in May 1994, and several versions
of the proposed Definition of Offenses exist throughout the interagency.
Article 4 of the Statute of the International Tribunal provides that:
1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons com-
mitting genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing
any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) genocide
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide.
Article 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal provides that:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether interna-
tional or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
[Vol. 23
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The attached document, however, is the original February 1994 version
that reflects no interagency input. The proposed Definition of Offenses
was never formally submitted by the United States because its length and
complexity made interagency coordination very difficult and time con-
suming, however, my proposed Definition of Offenses has been used ex-
tensively by an American Bar Association Task Force on War Crimes, 35
the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations ad hoc Committee for an In-
ternational Criminal Court,3 6 and the Office of the Prosecutor for the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.3 7
The purpose of drafting elements for each crime authorized for pros-
ecution is to clearly identify those facts that must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt before a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia can reach a finding of guilty. This
will ensure that the defense is fairly put on notice of the offense which
must be defended against, and will ensure consistency in charging. The
elements drafted for each offense in the proposed Definition of Offenses
meet the level of specificity required by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The enumeration of the elements of the offenses are not
intended to create law, but to reflect a consolidation of existing codified
and customary international law.
Each offense is discussed in a six-part format which includes the el-
ements of the offense, comment, lesser included offenses, maximum pun-
ishment, sample charge, and closely related offenses - similar in format
35. See Dorean Marguerite Koenig, Women and Rape in Ethnic Conflict and War, 5
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 129, 129 (1994).
36. At the request of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, U.S. Department of State, I
tailored this document on June 18, 1995 for use by the U.S. Delegation to the United Na-
tions ad hoc Committee for an International Criminal Court, of which I was a member at
that time, to fit the proposed crimes then within the jurisdiction of the proposed standing
international criminal court.
37. At the request of Michael J. Keegan, Office of the Prosecutor, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, I faxed a copy of this document to the In-
ternational Tribunal on June 25, 1993. This document was provided to the International
Tribunal with the permission of the U.S. Department of State so long as it was done with
the understanding that it was not an official submission of the United States but simply a
submission of a private citizen. See also LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: ESTABLISHMENT, OR-
GANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS TO DATE 37-43(1995); Memorandum from
Sheila Berry, Office of the Prosecutor, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, The Hague, The Netherlands, to Evan Bloom, Office of the Legal Advisor,
U.S. Department of State (Mar. 6, 1996) (on file with author). Both of these two refer-
ences contain a set of definition of offenses used by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia that are taken substantially verbatim from my February 1994
proposed Definition of Offenses.
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to the United States Manual for Courts-Martial. While the first part lists
those constituent facts which must be proven by the prosecution, the
comment that follows further defines terms used in the elements and
cross-references the international law from which the elements are de-
rived. A lesser included offense is one that is included within a charged
offense when the charged offense contains allegations which, either ex-
pressly or by fair implication, puts the accused on notice to be prepared
to defend against it in addition to the charged offense.
The fourth part for each offense specifies the maximum sentence al-
lowable." These are summarized at the end of the proposed Definition of
Offenses in a Table of Maximum Punishments. The sample charge is a
plain, concise statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged. It is intended to serve as a guide for charging a suspect and is
sufficient if it alleges every element of the charged offense expressly or
by necessary implication. The final part for each offense lists closely re-
lated offenses, which should assist the prosecution in deciding what other
offenses should be charged for contingencies of proof.
Definition one provides that any person who planned, instigated, or-
dered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, prepa-
ration, or execution of a crime proscribed by the Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal is individually responsible for the crime. A person in a
position of superior authority is individually responsible for a failure to
prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful behavior of his or her subordi-
nates if the person of superior authority knew or should have known that
such subordinates were about to commit or had committed crimes and
yet failed to take the necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or halt
the commission of such crimes or to punish the offenders. A *person who
commits a crime pursuant to an order of a superior is individually re-
sponsible unless the accused did not know, and a person of ordinary
sense and understanding would not have known, that the order was un-
lawful. This definition also provides for attempts and conspiracies.
Definitions two through five list the substantive crimes authorized
by articles two through five of the Statute of the International Tribunal.
Definition two provides the elements of the offenses for grave breaches
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which include the following acts when
committed against a person protected under the 1949 Geneva Conven-
38. These maximum punishments specified were derived principally from an analy-
sis of United States federal law. For two excellent comparative law analyses of sentencing
guidelines for international tribunals, see Daniel B. Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guide-
lines for the International Criminal Court, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 123 (1997),
and William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Ap-
proach, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461 (1997).
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tions: willful killing, torture, inhuman treatment, biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, ex-
tensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military
necessity, compelling service in the forces of a hostile power, willful
deprivation of the rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful deportation or
transfer or confinement, and taking of hostages. Rape was included as an
offense under the definition of willfully causing great suffering.
The third definition proscribes violations of the laws or customs of
war and reflects the principle that the right of belligerents to conduct
warfare is not unlimited. The Statute lists five examples of violations of
the laws or customs of war within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, but
specifically states that the list is not exhaustive. The enumerated crimes
prohibit the employment of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suf-
fering, wanton destruction or devastation not justified by military neces-
sity, attack of undefended areas, seizure or destruction of cultural prop-
erty, and plunder of public or private property. To allow a framework for
charging violations not listed as an example in the Statute, a definition
was included for "other violations of the laws or customs or war."
The elements of genocide found in the fourth definition were de-
rived from the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. The key distinction between genocide and similar
crimes in definition two, such as willful killing or causing serious bodily
injury, is that a conviction of genocide requires proof that the act was
committed with the intent to take part in a plan to destroy a particular
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.
Crimes against humanity are defined in the fifth definition as those
serious offenses directed against persons as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethni-
cal, racial, or religious grounds. There is considerable overlap between
these offenses and genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
and violations of the laws or customs of war. The possible victims of
crimes against humanity constitute a wider class than those who are ca-
pable of being made objects of these other offenses. Although both are
directed against a specific group, crimes against humanity can be distin-
guished from genocide in that they do not require an intent to destroy the
group, only proof that the act was part of a widespread or systematic at-
tack against a civilian population on national, political, ethnical, racial, or
religious grounds.
The final definition identifies affirmative defenses, which are those
that the defense must place at issue, but once at issue, the prosecution
has the burden of proof to establish that the defense did not exist. These
defenses include duress, coercion, and ignorance or mistake of fact. A
subjective and objective standard of knowledge for persons in positions
1999]
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of superior authority and persons acting pursuant to superior orders is
also codified. Each of these definitions and issues is discussed in greater
detail in the proposed Definition of Offenses.
IV. CONCLUSION-DRAFTING ELEMENTS OF CRIMES FOR A STANDING
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
After four years of intense negotiations, delegates from more than
120 countries met in Rome, Italy on June 15, 1998 for a five-week
United Nations conference to conform the final text of a treaty that
would create a standing international criminal court.39 By a vote of 120-
7, on July 17, 1998, these States overwhelmingly adopted a treaty that
would create a standing international criminal court after sixty ratifica-
tions. 40 The United States rejected the treaty because key provisions
would create "the possibility of politically motivated and unjustified
prosecution[s] . "...1,41 While the United States was seeking safeguards
that would protect all countries, not just the United States, from a
politicized and abusive court, it was frequently criticized and isolated for
its position.42
Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
defines the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court.43 This article pro-
vides that
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most seri-
ous crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Stat-
ute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
39. The UN and war criminals: How strong a court?, THE ECONOMIST, June 13,
1998, at 46.
40. Thomas W. Lippman, Worldwide War Crimes High Court Is Approved: Dele-
gates Overrule U.S. Objections, WASH. POST, July 18, 1998, at Al.
41. Id.
42. See id. See also Thomas W. Lippman, America Avoids The Stand: Why the U.S.
Objects To A World Criminal Court, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at Cl; TR. Goldman, A
World Apart? U.S. Stance on a New International Criminal Court Concerns Rights
Groups, LEGAL TIMES, June 8, 1998, at 1.
43. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 5, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9.
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2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles
121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect
to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."
Articles 6 through 8 then define in more detail the offenses of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes, respectively.4 5 Article 8 in-
cludes grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war. 6 Finally, article 9 provides that el-
ements of crimes "shall assist the Court in the interpretation and
application of articles 6, 7 and 8" and that they "shall be adopted by a
two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties. 47
To ensure a timely establishment of an international criminal court,
the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court decided in its Final Act that a Prepar-
atory Commission should be established to prepare proposals for practical
arrangements for the establishment and coming into operation of the
Court, including the draft texts of:
(a) Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) Elements of Crimes;
(c) A relationship agreement between the Court and the
United Nations;
(d) Basic principles governing a headquarters agreement to
be negotiated between the Court and the host country;
(e) Financial regulations and rules;
(f) An agreement on the privileges and immunities of the
.Court;
(g) A budget for the first financial year;
(h) The rules of procedure of the Assembly of States
Parties. 48
44. Id.
45. Id. arts. 6-8.
46. Id. art. 8.
47. Id. art. 9.
48. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex I, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/10.
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The Final Act provides that the draft texts of the rules of procedure and
evidence and of the elements of crimes shall be finalized before 30 June
2000.49 There will only be a "common understanding" of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
when these rules and elements of crimes are detailed as part of the juris-
diction documents of a newly established international criminal court.
The fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights coincides with the birth of the first standing international criminal
court that has the jurisdiction to enforce international human rights. I
strongly support the creation of an international criminal court, and the
scope of jurisdiction of this draft statute is an excellent starting point. It
begins conservatively with only those crimes that the international com-
munity has at least some experience in prosecuting - war crimes and
those closely related crimes such as genocide. The Preparatory Commit-
tee should learn from and build upon its experience with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
The proposed Definition of Offenses that is attached embraces the
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the Rome Statute
for an International Criminal Court. It comprehensively details the ele-
ments of the offenses for the great majority of those crimes within the
jurisdiction of the international criminal court proposed by the Rome
Statute, and has been used extensively by the American Bar Association,
the United States, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. The proposed Definition of Offenses attached are offered to
the Preparatory Commission as a baseline to begin its work for drafting
elements of the offenses for a standing international criminal court.
49. Id.
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PREAMBLE
This code comprises the definitions of those offenses authorized by
articles 2 thiough 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal. Each of-
fense is discussed in the following format:
(A) Elements of the offense
(B) Comment
(C) Lesser included offenses
(D) Maximum punishment
(E) Sample charge
(F) Closely related offenses
The elements of the offense are those constituent facts of the offense
which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution to
enable the Trial Chamber to reach a finding of guilty. The comments fur-
ther define terms used in the elements of the offense, and, where appro-
priate, discuss the conventions and the law from which the elements are
derived.
A lesser included offense is one that is included in a charged of-
fense when the charge contains allegations which either expressly or by
fair implication put the accused on notice to be prepared to defend
against it in addition to the offense specifically charged. This notice re-
quirement may be met when:
(A) All of the elements of the lesser offense are included in the
greater offense, and the common elements are identical or legally less se-
rious; or,
(B) All of the elements of the lesser offense are pled and included
in the greater offense charged, even though the included offense requires
proof of an element not required in the greater offense charged.
Article 24 of the Tribunal Statute limits authorized punishments to
imprisonment and the return of any property and proceeds acquired by
criminal conduct to the rightful owners. The subparagraphs which define
the maximum punishment for each offense only lists the maximum al-
lowable imprisonment; however, the punishment of any offense may in-
clude the return of any property or proceeds unlawfully obtained. The
Trial Chamber may also specify in its judgment whether or not the
sentences for multiple offenses shall be served concurrently or
consecutively.
The charge is a plain, concise statement of the essential facts consti-
tuting the offense charged. It is sufficient if it alleges every element of
the charged offense expressly or by necessary implication. When the
name of a victim is not available, it is sufficient in the charge to describe
them. The sample charge provided is intended to serve as a guide in
drafting charges, and can be varied in form and content as necessary. In
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considering what offenses should be charged, it is envisioned that the
prosecution will charge multiple offenses that are factually related for
contingencies of proof. To aid in this process, the last subparagraph of
each Definition lists closely related offenses which may be separately
charged.
PROPOSED DEFINITION OF OFFENSES
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW COMMITITED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
DEFINITION 1: PRINCIPALS, ATTEMPTS, AND CONSPIRACIES
1.1 PRINCIPALS.
(A) Defined. Any person who planned, instigated, ordered, commit-
ted or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execu-
tion of a crime proscribed by international law and under the jurisdiction
of the International Tribunal shall be individually responsible for the
crime. Presence at the scene of the crime is not necessary to make a su-
perior individually responsible for the crimes committed by his or her
subordinates. In contrast, the mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not make one a principal unless the requirements of subparagraph
1.1(B), below, have been met. A person may be a principal, even if the
perpetrator is not identified or prosecuted, or is found not guilty.
(B) Persons in positions of superior authority.
(1) A person in a position of superior authority is individually
responsible for offenses committed pursuant to his or her unlawful
orders.
(2) A person in a position of superior authority is individually
responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful behav-
ior of his or her subordinates. Such individual responsibility extends to
all crimes committed by subordinates if the person of superior authority
knew or should have known that such subordinates were about to commit
or had committed crimes and yet failed to take the necessary and reason-
able steps to prevent or halt the commission of such crimes or to punish
the offenders. (See Definition 6.3)
(C) Persons acting pursuant to superior orders. A person who com-
mits a crime pursuant to an order of a Government or a superior is indi-
vidually responsible; however, it is a defense that the accused was acting
pursuant to orders which he or she did not know, and a person of ordi-
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nary sense and understanding would not have known, were unlawful.
(See Definition 6.4)
COMMENTARY
Article 7, paragraph (1), of the Tribunal Statute provides that any
person who "planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred
to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsi-
ble for the crime." This article is intended to ensure that all persons bear
criminal responsibility for crimes they commit or to which they materi-
ally contribute. A person who is in a position of superior authority who
orders an offense makes a material contribution toward the commission
of a crime even though that superior did not actually commit the crime.
Paragraph (4) of article 7 defines those acts that do not relieve such per-
sons of responsibility, such as acts of subordinates committed pursuant to
superior orders.
Subparagraph (B) of this Definition places the burden of proof of
imputed responsibilities for superiors upon the prosecution. In so doing,
it reconciles a disparity between the Secretary-General's Report's com-
mentary and article 7. Paragraph 56 of the Secretary General's Report
imputes criminal responsibility to superiors who give unlawful orders or
who knew or had reason to know of their subordinates' crimes and did
nothing to stop or punish them. It is worded in such a way as to require
the prosecutor to prove the superior's conduct. In slight contrast, article
7, paragraph 3, is worded a bit differently. It states that the fact that
criminal offenses were committed by subordinates "does not relieve ...
superior[s] of criminal responsibility if [they] knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate[s]" committed or were about to commit the
offenses. This might be construed to impose upon the accused the burden
of showing that he or she neither knew nor had reason to know of
subordinate misconduct. If so, that burden is misplaced. It should remain
with the prosecutor.
1.2 ATTEMPTS.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused did a certain overt act;
(2) That the act was done with the specific intent to commit a
certain offense proscribed by international law and under the jurisdiction
of the International Tribunal;
(3) That the act amounted to more than mere preparation; and,
(4) That the act apparently tended to effect the commission of
the intended offense.
(B) Comment.
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(1) Intent. To constitute an attempt there must be a specific in-
tent to commit the offense accompanied by an overt act which directly
tends to accomplish the unlawful purpose.
(2) Preparation. Preparation consists of devising or arranging
the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense. The
overt act required goes beyond preparatory steps and is a direct move-
ment toward the commission of the offense. For example, a purchase of
matches with the intent to burn and damage an undefended town is not
an attempt to commit the wanton destruction of the town under Defini-
tion 3.3, but it is an attempt to commit wanton destruction if the accused
applies a burning match to a building, even if no fire or damage results.
The overt act need not be the last act essential to the consummation of
the offense.
(3) Factual impossibility. A person who purposely engages in
conduct which would constitute the offense if the attendant circumstances
were as that person believed them to be is guilty of an attempt. For ex-
ample, if the accused, without justification or excuse and with intent to
kill a person, points a weapon at that person and pulls the trigger, the ac-
cused may be guilty of an attempt to willfully kill or murder, even
though, unknown to the accused, the weapon is defective and will not
fire.
(C) Lesser included offenses. None.
(D) Maximum punishment. Any person found guilty of an attempt
under this Definition shall be subject to the same maximum punishment
authorized for the commission of the offense attempted, except that in no
case shall imprisonment exceeding twenty years be adjudged.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), attempt to (describe offense with suffi-
cient detail to include expressly or by necessary implication every ele-
ment of the offense attempted).
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
1.3 CONSPIRACIES.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused entered into an agreement with one or
more persons to commit an offense proscribed by international law and
under the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal; and,
(2) That, while the agreement continued to exist, and while the
accused remained a party to the agreement, the accused or at least one of
the co-conspirators performed an overt act for the purpose of bringing
about the object of the conspiracy.
(B) Comment.
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(1) Co-conspirators. Two or more persons are required in order
to have a conspiracy; however, knowledge of the identity of co-
conspirators and their particular connection with the criminal purpose
need not be established. A person may be guilty of conspiracy although
incapable of committing the intended offense. The conspirator who joined
an existing conspiracy can be convicted of this offense only if, at or after
the time of joining the conspiracy, an overt act in furtherance of the ob-
ject of the agreement is committed.
(2) Agreement. The agreement in a conspiracy need not be in
any particular form or manifested in any formal words. It is sufficient if
the minds of the parties arrive at a common understanding to accomplish
the object of the conspiracy, and this may be shown by the conduct of
the parties. The agreement need not state the means by which the con-
spiracy is to be accomplished or what part each conspirator is to play.
(3) Object of the agreement. The object of the agreement must,
at least in part, involve the commission of one or more offenses pro-
scribed by international law and under the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Tribunal. An agreement to commit several offenses is ordinarily
but a single conspiracy.
(4) Overt act. The overt act must be independent of the agree-
ment to commit the offense; must take place at the time of or after the
agreement; must be done by one or more of the conspirators, but not
necessarily the accused; and, must be done to effectuate the object of the
agreement. The overt act need not be criminal, but it must be a manifes-
tation that the agreement is being executed. Although committing the in-
tended offense may constitute the over act, it is not essential that the ob-
ject offense be committed. Any overt act is enough, no matter how
preliminary or preparatory in nature, as long as it is a manifestation that
the agreement is being executed. An overt act by one conspirator be-
comes the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to
that act and each conspirator is equally guilty even though each does not
participate in, or have knowledge of, all of the details of the execution of
the conspiracy.
(5) Liability for offenses. Each conspirator is liable for all of-
fenses committed pursuant to the conspiracy by any of the co-
conspirators while the conspiracy continues and the person remains a
party to the conspiracy.
(6) Withdrawal. A party to the conspiracy who abandons or
withdraws from the agreement to commit the offense before the commis-
sion of an overt act by any conspirator is not guilty of conspiracy. An ef-
fective withdrawal or abandonment must consist of affirmative conduct
which is wholly inconsistent with adherence to the unlawful agreement
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and which shows that the party has severed all connection with the
conspiracy.
(7) Factual impossibility. It is not a defense that the means
adopted by the conspirators to achieve their object, if apparently adapted
to that end, were actually not capable of success, or that the conspirators
were not physically able to accomplish their intended object.
(8) Conspiracy as a separate offense. A conspiracy to commit
an offense is a separate and distinct offense from the offense which is the
object of the conspiracy, and both the conspiracy and the consummated
offense which was its object may be charged, tried, and punished. The
commission-of the intended offense may also constitute the overt act
which is an element of the conspiracy to commit that offense.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment. Any person found guilty of conspiracy
under this Definition shall be subject to the same maximum punishment
authorized for the commission of the offense which is the object of the
conspiracy, except that in no case shall imprisonment exceeding twenty
years be adjudged.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), conspire with (name of co-conspirator(s))
to commit an offense proscribed by international law and under the juris-
diction of the International Tribunal, to wit: (description of offense), and
in order to effect the object of the conspiracy the said (name of co-
conspirator(s) who committed the overt act) did (description of overt act).
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
DEFINITION 2: GRAVE BREACHES OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
2.1 GENERALLY. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 proscribe certain acts
of commission or omission and classify them as "grave breaches." Arti-
cle 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal gives the Tribunal juris-
diction over such offenses. Conviction of these offenses requires proof of
the underlying elements.
(A) Grave breaches. Grave breaches are considered to be the fol-
lowing acts when committed against a person or persons protected under
the 1949 Geneva Conventions: willful killing, torture, inhuman treatment
including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or seri-
ous injury to body or health, extensive destruction and appropriation of
property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly, compelling service in the forces of a hostile power, willful
deprivation of the rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful deportation or
transfer or confinement, and taking of hostages.
(B) Protected persons. To determine whether a particular person is
protected under one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, one must
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resort to various articles of the Conventions. Generally, the wounded and
sick, medical personnel, chaplains, prisoners of war, shipwrecked per-
sons, and civilians in occupied territories who are not of the nationality
of the occupying State, are protected persons.
COMMENTARY
Generally, grave breaches are those serious acts delineated by the
Geneva Conventions when directed against persons or property protected
by one of the four conventions. By giving the Tribunal the power to
prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave
breaches, the UN Security Council has determined that such acts are
crimes punishable under international law. The definitions that follow
draw primarily from Pictet's Commentary on the Geneva Conventions.
2.2 WILLFUL KILLING.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That a certain named or described person is dead;
(2) That the person was protected under one or more of the
1949 Geneva Conventions;
(3) That the death resulted from the act or omission of the
accused;
(4) That the killing was unlawful; and,
(5) That, at the time of the killing, the accused had the intent to
kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a person.
(B) Comment.
(1) Generally. Known in most legal systems as murder, willful
killing requires, first, that the victim be dead and, second, that the death
be caused by the intentional act or omission of the accused. In most pe-
nal codes, the gravity of the offense and, therefore, the punishment varies
according to the level of intent. Certainly, premeditation is the most seri-
ous level; negligence is the least. Finally, the killing must be unlawful.
This factor forecloses the prosecution of lawful acts of war, but does not
prevent prosecution for the execution of persons without minimum due
process. The offense is committed at the place of the act or omission al-
though the victim may have died elsewhere. Whether death occurs at the
time of the accused's act or omission, or at some time thereafter, it must
have followed from an injury received by the victim which resulted from
the act or omission.
(2) Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. An unlawful kill-
ing is willful when the accused had either an intent to kill or an intent to
inflict great bodily harm.
(a) Intent. A person intends the natural and probable conse-
quences of an act purposely done. Hence, if a person does an intentional
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act likely to result in death or great bodily injury, that death or great
bodily injury was intended may be inferred. The intent need not be di-
rected toward the person killed, or exist for any particular time before
commission of the act, or have previously existed at all. It is sufficient
that it existed at the time of the act or omission.
(b) Great bodily harm means serious injury. It does not in-
clude minor injuries such as a black eye or a bloody nose, but it does in-
clude fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, and other serious bodily
injuries.
(3) Omissions. Willful killing clearly encompasses faults of
omission. Of course the omission must have been willful and intended to
cause death or great bodily harm. Again, if death is the foreseeable con-
sequence of such omission, intent is inferred. Examples include giving
instructions for the food rations of prisoners of war to be reduced to such
a point that malnutrition causes death and letting wounded persons die
for want of care that was reasonably available.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Inhuman treatment, including biological experiments. (See
Definition 2.4)
(3) Willfully causing great suffering. (See Definition 2.5)
(4) Causing serious injury to body or health. (See Definition
2.6)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for life.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and willfully kill (name or
description of person), a person protected under one or more of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, by means of (description of act or omission).
(F) Closely related offenses.
(1) Torture. (See Definition 2.3)
(2) Genocide. (See Definition 4.2)
(3) Murder. (See Definition 5.2)
(4) Extermination. (See Definition 5.3)
2.3 TORTURE.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused committed an act resulting in the infliction
of severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon a certain named or
described person;
(2) That such person was protected under one or more of the
1949 Geneva Conventions;
(3) That the accused, at the time of such act, had the specific
intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering;
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(4) That the torture was inflicted for such purposes as obtaining
from the immediate victim or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him or her for an act he or a third person committed or is sus-
pected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind;
(5) That the torture is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person act-
ing in an official capacity; and,
(6) That the pain or suffering inflicted was unlawful and did
not arise only from or was inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(B) Comment. These elements derive from the Convention Against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, UNGA Res. 39/46 (1987). The impetus of this offense is the inflic-
tion of pain or injury for certain listed purposes. Serious injury to body
or health is not an element of this offense. If serious injury results from
the torture, it should be pled as a matter in aggravation, and consequently
a lesser offense will be included. The force used in inflicting the pain or
suffering upon the victim may have been directly or indirectly applied.
Great suffering not only includes injury to body or physical health, but
also severe pain and mental anguish.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Inhuman treatment, including biological experiments. (See
Definition 2.4)
(3) Willfully causing great suffering. (See Definition 2.5)
(4) Causing serious injury to body or health (See Definition
2.6)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for forty years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and intentionally torture
(name or description of person), a person protected under one or more of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for such purposes of [obtaining from such
person or a third person information or a confession] [punishing such
person for an act he or a third person committed or is suspected of hav-
ing committed] [intimidating or coercing such person] [description of any
other reason based on discrimination of any kind], by means of (descrip-
tion of act or omission), and (at the instigation) (with the consent or ac-
quiescence) of (description of public official or other person acting in an
official capacity).
(F) Closely related offenses. Torture and mutilation (See Definition
5.7)
2.4 INHUMAN TREATMENT, INCLUDING BIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS.
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(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) Biological experimentation.
(a) That the accused subjected a certain named or described
person to a particular medical or biological procedure or treatment;
(b) That such person was protected under one or more of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions;
(c) That the accused intended to subject such person to non-
therapeutic procedures or treatment; and,
(d) That, under the circumstances, the procedure was unlaw-
ful and not part of or justified by the proper medical, dental, or psycho-
logical treatment of such person. [Note: When serious injury to body or
health results, add the following element:]
(e) That serious injury to body or health resulted therefrom.
(2) Other inhuman treatment.
(a) That the accused committed a certain act or omission
against a certain described or named person;
(b) That such person was a protected person under one or
more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and,
(c) That the accused intended to unlawfully impair the
physical or moral integrity of such person or otherwise subject him or
her to indignities, pain, or suffering grossly out of proportion to the treat-
ment expected of one human being from another. [Note: When serious
injury to body or health results, add the following element:]
(d) That serious injury to body or health resulted therefrom.
(B) Comment. These acts describe some injurious treatment accorded
persons protected by the Geneva Conventions. The types of acts contem-
plated in this section include, but are not limited to, treatment that causes
physical or mental injury, unnecessary physical treatment by medical
providers or others unrelated to therapy offered for other than therapeutic
purposes, or assault on the physical or moral integrity of a person for
any reason.
(1) Biological experimentation. The Geneva Conventions do not
prohibit doctors from using new methods of treatment justified by medi-
cal reasons and based solely on the concern to improve a patient's health.
It must be possible to use new treatments provided they are administered
for therapeutic purposes.
(2) Inhuman treatment. The Geneva Conventions provide that
protected persons must always be treated with humanity; therefore, the
sort of treatment covered here would be whatever is contrary to that gen-
eral rule. It certainly encompasses more than just injury to body or
health. The object of the Conventions is to preserve human dignity;
therefore, inhuman treatment is any act or omission inconsistent with that
object.
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(3) Examples. Any act of violence or intimidation inspired not
by military requirements or a legitimate desire for security but by a sys-
tematic scorn for human values constitutes inhuman treatment. Insults,
exposing prisoners to corporal punishment and forcing a woman into
prostitution are examples.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Willfully causing great suffering. (See Definition 2.5)
(3) Causing serious injury to body or health (See Definition
2.6)
(D) Maximum punishment.
(1) Biological experimentation. Imprisonment for life.
(2) Other inhuman treatment. Imprisonment for twenty years.
(E) Sample charge.
(1) Biological experimentation.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), subject (name or description of person),
a person protected under one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
to unlawful biological treatment by means of (description of act or omis-
sion) [and did thereby inflict serious injury upon his/her body/health].
(2) Other inhuman treatment.
In that (name of accused) did (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), subject (name of person), a person pro-
tected under one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to unlawful
inhuman treatment by means of (description of act or omission) [and did
thereby inflict serious injury upon his/her body/health].
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
2.5 WILLFULLY CAUSING GREAT SUFFERING.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused committed a certain act or omission upon
a certain named or described person;
(2) That such person was protected under one or more of the
1949 Geneva Conventions;
(3) That the accused, at the time, committed the certain act
with the intent to unlawfully inflict great suffering; and,
(4) That great suffering was thereby inflicted.
[Note: When rape is the certain act, add the following elements:]
(5) That the certain act consisted of sexual intercourse with
such person; and,
(6) That the act was done by force and without such person's
consent.
(B) Comment.
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(1) Nature of offense. This refers to suffering inflicted without
the underlying purposes necessary for a charge of torture or biological
experimentation. This offense is a general offense in that it encompasses
many intentional acts (such as rape, forcible sodomy, and indecent acts)
or omissions which cause great mental and/or physical suffering.
(2) Intent to inflict great suffering. The additional requirement
that the underlying act must be intended to cause great suffering is in-
cluded to avoid the problem of nullen crimen sine lege (no crime without
law). Without it, even innocuous acts or omissions might, if resulting in
great suffering, be subject to prosecution. Examples include acts consid-
ered tortious but not criminal under many national legal systems.
(3) Great suffering. This not only includes injury to body or
physical health, but also severe pain and mental anguish.
(4) Rape. This offense is sexual intercourse with a person by
force and without his or her consent. This includes forcible sodomy. For
either offense, any penetration of the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of a
person with the accused's sexual organ is sufficient to complete the of-
fense. Forced intercourse or sodomy with a third person or animal is also
contemplated by this offense. For both offenses, force and lack of con-
sent are required. The lack of consent required is more than mere lack of
acquiescence. If a person in possession of his or her mental and physical
faculties fails to make his or her lack of consent reasonably manifest by
taking such measures of resistance as are called for by the circumstances,
the inference may be drawn that he or she did consent. Consent, how-
ever, may not be inferred if resistance would have been futile, where re-
sistance is overcome by threats of death or great bodily harm, or where
the victim is unable to resist because of the lack of mental or physical
faculties. In such a case there is no consent and the force involved in
penetration will suffice. All the surrounding circumstances are to be con-
sidered in determining whether a person gave his or her consent, or
whether he or she failed or ceased to resist only because of a reasonable
fear of death or serious injury. If there is actual consent, although ob-
tained by fraud, the act is not rape, but if to the accused's knowledge the
person is of unsound mind or unconscious to an extent rendering him or
her incapable of giving consent, the act is rape.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Causing serious injury to body or health. (See Definition
2.6)
(D) Maximum punishment.
(1) Rape or forcible sodomy. Imprisonment for life.
(2) Other acts causing great suffering. Imprisonment for forty
years.
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(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and willfully cause great suf-
fering to (name or description of person), a person protected under one
or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, by means of (description of
act or omission)(rape)(forcible sodomy).
(F) Closely related offenses. Rape and other forms of sexual assault,
including enforced prostitution. (See Definition 5.8)
2.6 CAUSING SERIOUS INJURY TO BODY OR HEALTH.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused committed a certain act or omission upon
a certain named or described person;
(2) That such person was protected under one or more of the
1949 Geneva Conventions;
(3) That the accused thereby inflicted serious injury upon the
person; and,
(4) That the accused, at the time, intended to unlawfully inflict
serious injury to body or health. [Note: When maiming is the certain act,
add the following element:]
(5) That this injury seriously disfigured the person's body, de-
stroyed or disabled an organ or member, or seriously diminished the per-
son's physical vigor by the injury to the organ or member.
(B) Comment. Serious injury to body or health includes any serious
injury. Unlike the offense of willfully causing great suffering, this offense
requires that injury actually have been inflicted. The offense is complete
if such an injury is inflicted even though there is a possibility that the
victim may eventually recover the use of that part of his or her body in-
jured. Maiming is an aggravated form of serious injury characterized by
causing the loss of or loss of function of a member or organ. Intent suffi-
cient to constitute this offense may be to injure and not necessarily to in-
flict serious injury or maim. When serious injury has been inflicted by
means of intentionally using force in a manner likely to achieve that re-
sult, it may be inferred that serious injury was intended.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment.
(1) Willfully causing serious injury. Imprisonment for ten years.
(2) Maiming. Imprisonment for forty years.
(E) Sample charge.
(1) Willfully causing serious injury.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and seriously injure the (body
or health) of (name or description of person), a person protected under
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one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, by (description of act or
omission and of injury).
(2) Maiming.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully maim (name of person), a
person protected under one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, by
(description of act or omission and of injury).
(F) Closely related offenses.
(1) Willfully causing serious injury. None.
(2) Maiming, Torture, and Mutilation. (See Definition 5.7)
2.7 EXTENSIVE DESTRUCTION OR APPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY, NOT JUSTI-
FIED BY MILITARY NECESSITY AND CARRIED OUT UNLAWFULLY AND
WANTONLY.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) Extensive destruction.
(a) That the accused willfully or recklessly destroyed or
damaged certain real or personal property;
(b) That the property was protected by one or more of the
1949 Geneva Conventions;
(c) That the destruction or damage was unlawful;
(d) That the destruction clearly exceeded that required by
military necessity; and,
(e) That the amount of destruction was extensive.
(2) Extensive appropriation.
(a) That the accused willfully and unlawfully took, ob-
tained, or withheld certain real or personal property from the possession
of the owner or any other person;
(b) That such property was protected under one or more of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions;
(c) That the taking, obtaining, or withholding by the ac-
cused was with the intent to deprive another person of the use and bene-
fit of the property or to appropriate the property for the use of any per-
son other than the owner;
(d) That under the circumstances, the appropriation clearly
exceeded that required by military necessity; and,
(e) That the amount of appropriation was extensive.
(B) Comment. The elements of this offense are contained in its
description:
(1) Destruction or appropriation of property. First, there must
be destruction or appropriation of property. This offense does not require
the complete destruction of property. Extensive damage is within the def-
inition of this offense. The type of property contemplated here is prop-
erty protected by one or more of the Geneva Conventions. For example,
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the Fourth Convention forbids the destruction of civilian hospitals. If the
other elements are satisfied, such destruction might give rise to this of-
fense. In contrast, the destruction of enemy military property is not pro-
hibited and, therefore, is not an offense.
(2) Appropriation. In this context, "appropriation" means tak-
ing the property from its lawful owner with or without the intent to per-
manently deprive.
(3) Extensive. The destruction and appropriation must be exten-
sive. Thus, .an isolated incident would not be enough. Beyond that, what
constitutes "excessive" is left for the Tribunal to decide. It might, how-
ever, consider the commonly-defined act of pillage to be an apt analogy.
(4) Unlawful. The destruction and appropriation must be unlaw-
ful. As with the crime of willful killing, it must be proved that such acts
were not results of lawful acts of war. Acts undertaken during war as a
result of military necessity should not be considered unlawful.
(5) Intent. Finally, there must be intent; here, defined as
"wanton."
(6) Collateral damage. It is not unlawful to cause incidental in-
jury or death to civilians, or collateral damage to civilian objects, during
an attack upon a legitimate military objective. The rule of proportional-
ity, however, requires that incidental injury or collateral damage should
not be excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the at-
tack. Commanders and unit leaders must take all reasonable precautions,
taking into account military and humanitarian considerations, to keep ci-
vilian casualties and damage to the minimum consistent with mission ac-
complishment and the security of the force. In each instance, the com-
mander or unit leader must determine whether incidental injuries and
collateral damage would be excessive, on the basis of an honest and rea-
sonable estimate of the facts available to him. Similarly, the commander
or unit leader must decide, in light of all the facts known or reasonably
available to him, including the need to conserve resources and complete
the mission successfully, whether to adopt an alternative method of at-
tack, if reasonably available, to reduce civilian casualties and damage.
(7) Military necessity. Military necessity provides that only that
degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed
conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy
with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources may be
applied. This principle permits the destruction of life of armed enemies
and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the
armed conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of armed enemies and
others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent
inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill.
The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded
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by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of
international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the
destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It is
lawful to destroy railways, lines of communication, or any other property
that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and churches even
may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit
the wanton devastation of a district or the willful infliction of suffering
upon its inhabitants for the sake of suffering alone.
(8) Proportionality. This principle is derived from that of mili-
tary necessity, in that the latter allows only that use of force necessary
for the purpose of armed conflict. Proportionality is intended to prohibit
force which needlessly or unnecessarily causes or aggravates both human
suffering or physical destruction. The principle of proportionality, there-
fore, prohibits attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combina-
tion thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and di-
rect military advantage anticipated.
(9) Military objective. Military objectives are those objects
which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to
the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or
partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite
military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of
the attack. Military advantage may involve a variety of considerations in-
cluding the security of the attacking force. Proper targets for attack in-
clude such military objectives as enemy warships and military aircraft,
naval and military auxiliaries, naval and military bases ashore, warship
construction and repair facilities, military depots and warehouses, fuel oil
storage areas, docks, port facilities, harbors, bridges, airfields, military
vehicles, armor, artillery, ammunition stores, troop concentrations and
embarkation points, lines of communication and other objects used to
conduct or support military operations. Proper targets also include geo-
graphic targets, such as a mountain pass or a specific sea area, and build-
ings and facilities that provide administrative and personnel support for
military and naval operations such as barracks, communications and com-
mand and control facilities, headquarters buildings, mess halls, and train-
ing areas. Proper economic targets for naval attack include enemy lines
of communication, rail yards, bridges, rolling stock, barges, lighters, in-
dustrial installations producing war-fighting products, and power genera-
tion plants. Economic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively
support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability may also be
attacked.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Extensive destruction.
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(a) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(b) Wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or dev-
astation not justified by military necessity. (See Definition 3.3)
(c) Attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of unde-
fended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings. (See Definition 3.4)
(d) Seizure of destruction or willful damage done to institu-
tions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science. (See Definition 3.5)
(e) Plunder of public or private property. (See Definition
3.6)
(2) Extensive appropriation.
(a) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(b) Seizure of destruction or willful damage done to institu-
tions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science. (See Definition 3.5)
(c) Plunder of public or private property. (See Definition
3.6)
(D) Maximum punishment.
(1) Extensive destruction. Imprisonment for forty years.
(2) Extensive appropriation. Imprisonment for twenty years.
(E) Sample charge.
(1) Extensive destruction.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and (willfully) (wantonly)
(destroy) (damage) (description of property) by (description of act or
omission), property protected under one or more of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and, that under the circumstances, the (destruction) (dam-
age) was extensive.
(2) Extensive appropriation.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and wantonly appropriate
(description of property) by (description of act or omission), property
protected under one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and, that
under the circumstances, the appropriation was extensive.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
2.8 COMPELLING A PRISONER OF WAR OR A CIVILIAN TO SERVE IN THE
FORCES OF A HOSTILE POWER.
(A) Elements -of the offense.
(1) That the accused coerced a certain named or described per-
son, by act or threat of death or serious harm to that person or a third
person, to engage in armed combat against that person's own country;
(2) That the person coerced is a prisoner of war or civilian pro-
tected by one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and,
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(3) That the acts compelled do not constitute lawful prisoner of
war or civilian labor as defined by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
(B) Comment. This offense is derived from a similar provision in ar-
ticle 23 of the (Hague) Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, which states that "a belligerent is ... forbidden to
compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of
war directed against their own country . . . ." The essence of this of-
fense, then, is the coerced recruitment of nationals of a party to the hos-
tilities to take part in combat operations directed against their own coun-
try. It is important to distinguish coerced recruitment to conduct
hostilities from the lawful practice of requiring prisoners of war to per-
form work defined by articles 49-57 of (Geneva) Convention (III) Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, and requiring civilians
to perform work defined by articles 51 and 52 of (Geneva) Convention
(IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for ten years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully compel (name or description
of person), a prisoner of war or civilian protected under one or more of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to serve against (his) (her) will in the
forces of (belligerent State), a power engaged in armed conflict with such
person's State.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
2.9 WILLFULLY DEPRIVING A PRISONER OF WAR OR A CIVILIAN OF THE
RIGHTS OF FAIR AND REGULAR TRIAL.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused executed, confined, or otherwise punished
a certain named or described prisoner of war or civilian within his con-
trol or authority;
(2) That the prisoner of war or civilian is a person protected by
one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions;
(3) That such act was unlawful in that it exceeded what is al-
lowed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions in such cases as detention pend-
ing determination of status or offense, as a prisoner of war, or for the
safety and security of the person;
(4) That the act was performed without first according the per-
son a fair and regular trial as defined by the Third or Fourth Geneva
Conventions of 1949; and,
(5) That the accused intended to deprive the person of such fair
and regular trial.
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(B) Comment. The substance of this offense is the violation of one
or more of the penal provisions of articles 82 - 88; 99 - 108 of (Geneva)
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949,
and articles 64 - 78 of (Geneva) Convention (IV) Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949. These provisions establish
procedural and substantive rights that must be respected by any detaining
or occupying force. Elements of this offense must necessarily be derived
from the language of the particular article violated. Therefore, those arti-
cles are incorporated by reference here.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Unlawful confinement of a civilian. (See Definition 2.10)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for five years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and willfully deprive (name
or description of person), a prisoner of war or civilian protected under
one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, of (description of right
deprived), a right prescribed by one or more of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions as necessary to a fair and regular trial.
(F) Closely related offenses.
(1) Imprisonment. (See Definition 5.6)
(2) The passing of sentence and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensa-
ble by civilized peoples. (See Definition 5.10)
2.10 UNLAWFUL DEPORTATION OR TRANSFER, OR UNLAWFUL CONFINEMENT
OF A CIVILIAN.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) Unlawful deportation or transfer of a civilian
(a) That the accused unlawfully expelled a certain named or
described person from the territory of the State in which that person
resides.
(b) That the person was a civilian protected under one or
more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions;
(c) That the accused knew the person's status as lawful resi-
dent of the territory; and,
(d) That the deportation was not conducted as an evacuation
for safety or any other lawful reason.
(2) Unlawful confinement of a civilian
(a) That the accused unlawfully held, confined, or otherwise
restrained the liberty of a person;
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(b) That the person was a civilian protected under one or
more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and,
(c) That such restraint was effected without affording the
procedural and substantive protections prescribed in the Fourth Geneva
Convention (1949).
(B) Comment. Articles 45 and 49 of (Geneva) Convention (IV) Rel-
ative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, prohibit
the transfer or deportation of civilians under some conditions. Violations
of these articles are prosecutable. Similarly, occupying powers are au-
thorized, for imperative reasons of security, to intern civilians. Articles
78 - 104 discuss the bases and conditions of such internment. Unlawful
confinement of a civilian is a violation of article 78 - defining the per-
missible bases for internment - and not the subsequent articles defining
internment conditions. It is the prosecutor's burden to prove that intern-
ment of civilians was not undertaken for security purposes.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment.
(1) Unlawful deportation or transfer of a civilian. Imprison-
ment for ten years.
(2) Unlawful confinement of a civilian. Imprisonment for five
years.
(E) Sample charge.
(1) Unlawful deportation or transfer of a civilian
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully (deport) (transport) (name or
description of person), a civilian person protected under one or more of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, from the territory known by the accused
to be the person's lawful residence, by means of (description of act or
omission).
(2) Unlawful confinement of a civilian
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully confine (name or description
of person), a civilian person protected under one or more of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, without the procedural and substantive protections
prescribed by the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), by means of
(description of act or omission).
(F) Closely related offenses.
(1) Unlawful deportation or transfer of a civilian. Deportation.
(See Definition 5.5)
(2) Unlawful confinement of a civilian
(a) Imprisonment. (See Definition 5.6)
(b) The passing of sentence and the carrying out of execu-
tions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
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court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples. (See Definition 5.10)
2.11 TAKING CIVILIANS AS HOSTAGES.
(A) Elements of the offense. see hostages convention
(1) That the accused seized, detained, or otherwise unlawfully
held hostage a certain named or described person;
(2) That the person was protected under one or more of the
1949 Geneva Conventions;
(3) That the accused threatened to injure, kill, or continue to
detain such person; and,
(4) That the act was performed with the intent to compel a
State, international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical
person, or a group of persons to do or refrain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the safe release of the hostage.
(B) Comment. Similar to the unlawful confinement or internment of
civilians, this offense requires proof that particular civilians were unlaw-
fully deprived of their liberty. What distinguishes this offense, however,
is the additional element that the accused threatened either to prolong the
hostage's detention or to put him or her to death.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for five years.
(E) Sample charge..
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully hold hostage (name or
description of person), a civilian person protected under one or more of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, with the intent to compel (name of the
State, international intergovernmental organization, natural or juridical
person, or group of persons) to refrain from (description of act) as an
(explicit) (implicit) condition for the safe release of the person.
(F) Closely related offenses.
(1) Enslavement. (See Definition 5.4)
(2) Imprisonment. (See Definition 5.6)
(3) Taking of hostages. (See Definition 5.10)
DEFINITION 3: VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR
3.1 GENERALLY.
The 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land and its Regulations define the permissible means and
methods of warfare accepted as customary international law. The Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg recognized in 1946 that the right
of belligerents to conduct warfare is not unlimited and that resort to cer-
tain methods of waging war is prohibited. Whereas the offenses defined
above were violations of Geneva Convention and customary humanitarian
law, the following crimes are more accurately characterized as breaches
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of the laws and customs regulating the methods of waging war. The Tri-
bunal Statute includes only the offenses listed at Definitions 3.2 through
3.6. Article 23 of Hague IV lists these and a number of acts "especially
forbidden." These other acts are incorporated in Definitions 3.2 through
3.6, or are covered in Definition 3.7. The detailed discussion of collateral
damage, military necessity, proportionality, and military objectives found
in Definition 2.7 applies to all offenses found under Definition 3. Con-
viction of these offenses requires proof of the underlying elements.
3.2 EMPLOYMENT OF POISONOUS WEAPONS OR OTHER WEAPONS CALCU-
LATED TO CAUSE UNNECESSARY SUFFERING.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused intentionally used certain weapons during
combat;
(2) That such weapon is prohibited by international law, or is
lawful but used in a manner calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
and,
(3) That the accused knew the use of such weapons to be un-
lawful and prohibited under international law.
(B) Comment.
(1) Combat. The first element includes the word "combat" in
order to distinguish law enforcement activity from armed conflict. Since
it is not settled under international law the extent to which some weap-
ons may be used in non-combat situations, this term limits this offense to
those situations in which the international community agrees that employ-
ment of prohibited weapons constitutes an offense.
(2) Unnecessary suffering. This principle states that the employ-
ment of weapons, material, and methods of warfare that are designed to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited because
the degree of pain or injury, or the certainty of death, they produce is
needlessly or clearly disproportionate to the military advantage to be
gained by their use. For example, using materials that are difficult to de-
tect or undetectable by field x-ray equipment, such as glass or clear
plastic, as the injuring mechanism in military ammunition is prohibited,
since they unnecessarily inhibit the treatment of wounds. Use of such
materials as incidental components in ammunition, for example, as wad-
ding or packing, is not prohibited. A few weapons, such as poisoned pro-
jectiles, are unlawful, no matter how employed. Others may be rendered
unlawful by alteration, such as by coating ammunition with a poison. Fi-
nally, any weapon may be set to an unlawful purpose when it is directed
against noncombatants and other protected persons and property, such as
use of artillery to fire upon undefended towns.
(2) Indiscriminate effect. A corollary concept to the principle of
unnecessary suffering is that weapons which by their nature are incapable
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of being directed specifically against military objectives, and therefore
that put noncombatants at equivalent risk, are forbidden due to their in-
discriminate effect. A weapon is not indiscriminate simply because it
may cause incidental or collateral civilian casualties, provided such casu-
alties are not foreseeably excessive in light of the expected military ad-
vantage to be gained. An artillery round that is capable of being directed
with a reasonable degree of accuracy at a military target is not an indis-
criminate weapon simply because it may miss its mark or inflict collat-
eral damage.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for twenty years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and intentionally use (name
or description of weapon) during combat, a weapon known to the ac-
cused to be (prohibited by international law) (used in a manner calcu-
lated to cause unnecessary suffering), by (description of act or omission).
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
COMMENTARY
This offense is a violation of article 23 of the (Hague) Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907. The fol-
lowing is a listing, by way of example only, of other international agree-
ments which further define the means and methods of warfare which are
illegal under international law.
(1) (St. Petersburg) Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of
War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, 1868.
(2) (Hague) Declaration (IV, .2) Concerning Asphyxiating
Gases, 1899.
(3) (Hague) Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets,
1899 (Dum-Dum Declaration).
(4) (Geneva) Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods
of Warfare, 1925.
(5) Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production,
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on Their Destruction, 1972.
3.3 WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, TOWNS OR VILLAGES, OR DEVASTA-
TION NOT JUSTIFIED BY MILITARY NECESSITY.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused intentionally or recklessly destroyed or
devastated cities, towns, or villages, or significant parts thereof; and,
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(2) The destruction or devastation was unlawful in that it
clearly exceeded that required by military necessity.
(B) Comment. This offense is similar to Definition 3.4 in that it re-
lates to the destruction of cities, towns, and villages. The key distinction
is that it is alleged here that the cities, towns, and villages were lawful
military targets. The essence of the offense is that, although attacking
such places is permissible, the level of damage that may be inflicted
must be proportional to the objectives sought. Where such damage is
clearly disproportionate, prosecution may be warranted. The word
"clearly" is emphasized here because the distinction between lawful and
unlawful levels of force is often blurred on the battlefield. Thus, to con-
stitute an offense, the excessive force must have been intentionally or
recklessly inflicted.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings. (See Definition 3.4)
(3) Seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, his-
toric monuments and works of art and science. (See Definition 3.5)
(4) Plunder of public or private property. (See Definition 3.6)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for twenty years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and (intentionally) (reck-
lessly) (destroyed) (devastated) (name or description of the city, town, or
village, or significant part thereof), and, that under the circumstances, the
(destruction) (devastation) clearly exceeded the requirements of military
necessity.
(F) Closely related offenses. Extensive destruction or appropriation
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly. (See Definition 2.7)
3.4 ATTACK, OR BOMBARDMENT, BY WHATEVER MEANS, OF UNDEFENDED
TOWNS, VILLAGES, DWELLINGS, OR BUILDINGS.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused intentionally attacked, by any means or
method, an undefended town, village, dwelling, or building that was not
otherwise a lawful military target; and,
(2) That the accused knew or should reasonably have known
the place attacked was undefended and clearly not a lawful military
target.
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(B) Comment. The concept of "defended place" has been subordi-
nated in recent years to the concept of "legitimate military target." De-
fended places generally include:
(1) A fort or fortified place;
(2) A city or town surrounded by detached defense positions,
which is considered jointly with such defense positions as an indivisible
whole; or,
(3) A place which is occupied by a combatant military force or
through which such a force is passing. The occupation of such a place by
medical units alone is not sufficient to make it a defended place.
The fact that a place attacked does not conform to any of these descrip-
tions is not, however, sufficient basis upon which to rest prosecution for
this offense. While a place may be "undefended" in a traditional sense,
international law also recognizes that individual locations within unde-
fended areas may be attacked. Such lawful targets include factories pro-
ducing military munitions and supplies, ports and railroads used for
transportation of military supplies, and other places devoted to support of
military operations. The intent requirement makes clear that unintentional
damage done to objects within close proximity to lawful targets is not
prosecutable. The presence of United Nations forces, regardless of
whether or not they are armed, does not make an otherwise undefended
place a military objective.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, his-
toric monuments and works of art and science. (See Definition 3.5)
(3) Plunder of public or private property. (See Definition 3.6)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for twenty years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and intentionally attacked
(name or description of the town, village, dwelling, or building), a place
that the accused knew or should reasonably have known was undefended
and clearly not a lawful military target.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
3.5 SEIZURE OF, DESTRUCTION OR WILLFUL DAMAGE DONE TO INSTITUTIONS
DEDICATED TO RELIGION, CHARITY AND EDUCATION, THE ARTS AND SCI-
ENCES, HISTORIC MONUMENTS AND WORKS OF ART AND SCIENCE.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused seized, destroyed, or willfully damaged
certain cultural property protected by conventional or customary interna-
tiona law such as institutions dedicated to religion, charity and educa-
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tion, the arts and sciences, historic monuments, and works of art and sci-
ence; and,
(2) That the seizure, destruction, or damage was unlawful in
that it clearly exceeded that required by military necessity.
(B) Comment. Cultural property as contemplated by this offense in-
cludes institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts
and sciences, historic monuments, and works of art and science. Conven-
tional and customary international law has long provided for the protec-
tion of cultural property during occupation and armed conflict. Combat-
ants have an obligation to safeguard cultural property. They are not
permitted to use cultural property for military purposes or to attack cul-
tural property; however, this protection is not absolute. That portion of
cultural property used for military purposes, such as a location for an ob-
servation post or a platform for sniper fire, is a lawful military objective
for so long as it is unlawfully used and military necessity requires that it
be attacked.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Plunder of public or private property. (See Definition 3.6)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for twenty years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully (seized) (and willfully) (de-
stroyed) (damaged) cultural property protected by international law, to
wit: (name or description of the institution dedicated to religion, charity
or education, the arts or sciences, historic monuments or works of art or
science), and, that under the circumstances, the (seizure) (destruction)
(damage) of such property clearly exceeded the requirements of military
necessity.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
COMMENTARY
Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute defines cultural property as institu-
tions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments, and works of art and science. To determine the pro-
tection accorded cultural property and to determine what is an unlawful
attack, reference must be made to customary and conventional interna-
tional law.
3.6 PLUNDER OF PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROPERTY.
(A) Elements of the offense.
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(1) That the accused wasted, spoiled, or stole certain public or
private property protected by conventional or customary international
law;
(2) That the property belonged to another person or to a State;
(3) That the wasting, spoiling, or stealing was done with the in-
tent to permanently deprive the lawful owner of the property; and,
(4) That the acts were unlawful in that they were clearly not re-
quired by military necessity.
(B) Comment. This offense is a violation of article 33 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as articles 28 and 47 of the (Hague)
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of
1907. It is reflective of an old principle of international law intended to
alleviate the suffering resulting from the destruction and theft of real and
personal property.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for ten years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully (wasted) (spoiled) (stole)
property protected by international law, to wit: (name or description of
the public or private property), with the intent to permanently deprive the
lawful owner of protected property not belonging to the accused, and,
that under the circumstances, the acts clearly exceeded the requirements
of military necessity.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
3.7 OTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused intentionally did or failed to do certain
acts;
(2) That, under the circumstances, the accused's conduct was a
violation of the laws or customs of war; and,
(3) That the accused knew or should reasonably have known
that the act or omission alleged was unlawful in that it was clearly a vio-
lation of the laws or customs of war.
(B) Comment. Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute enumerates five ex-
amples of the violations of the laws or customs of war within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, but specifically states that the list is not exhaus-
tive. This Definition is intended to capture those offenses within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal that are not otherwise specifically mentioned
elsewhere within this code. If any offense is specifically made punishable
by another Definition, it should be charged as a violation of that Defini-
tion. The requirement of the third element that the accused knew or
should reasonably have known that the act or omission alleged was un-
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lawful in that it was clearly a violation of the laws or customs of war
makes this Definition consistent with the principle of nullen crimen sine
lege.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for ten years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and intentionally (description
of the violation of the laws or customs of war), an act that the accused
knew or should reasonably have known was clearly a violation of the
laws or customs of war.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
DEFINITION 4: GENOCIDE
4.1 GENERALLY.
The crime of genocide is committed with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
The elements of this offense are derived from the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4.2 GENOCIDE.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused committed an act or omission against a
certain named or described person;
(2) That such person was a member of a national, ethnical, ra-
cial, or religious group;
(3) That the accused committed such act or omission with the
intent to take part in a plan to destroy such group in whole or in part;
and,
(4) That the act or omission was unlawful and one of the
following:
(a) Willful killing;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm;
(c) Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to
bring about the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; or,
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
(B) Comment. The origins of the Genocide Convention are rooted in
the Nazi atrocities against groups of people during World War II. Since
then, however, numerous other examples of genocide have occurred
throughout the world, including, arguably, Iraq's systematic killing of
Kuwaiti citizens in an attempt to eradicate their national identity. The key
distinction between genocide and any other crime described in Defini-
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tions 2.2 through 2.6 is that conviction of genocide requires proof of in-
tent to destroy a group of the type described in the last element. Article
2 of the Tribunal Statute makes acts of genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and complic-
ity in genocide, punishable as an act of genocide. Definition 1 regarding
the individual responsibility of principals contemplates criminal culpabil-
ity for acts of genocide themselves or any conspiracy, incitement, at-
tempt, or complicity in such crimes. Article 2 also includes an attempt to
commit genocide. Since only one or more of the enumerated acts are re-
quired with the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part, and not the
actual destruction of the group, it is unnecessary to specifically include
an attempted genocide within the elements of the offense or as a separate
offense.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Willful killing. (See Definition 2.2)
(3) Torture. (See Definition 2.3)
(4) Inhuman treatment, including biological experiments. (See
Definition 2.4)
(5) Willfully causing great suffering. (See Definition 2.5)
(6) Causing serious injury to body or health. (See Definition
2.6)
(7) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the
rights of fair and regular trial. (See Definition 2.9)
(8) Unlawful deportation or transfer, or unlawful confinement
of a civilian. (See Definition 2.10)
(9) Taking civilians as hostages. (See Definition 2.11)
(10) Murder. (See Definition 5.2)
(11) Extermination. (See Definition 5.3)
(12) Enslavement. (See Definition 5.4)
(13) Deportation. (See Definition 5.5)
(14) Imprisonment. (See Definition 5.6)
(15) Torture and mutilation. (See Definition 5.7)
(16) Rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced
prostitution. (See Definition 5.8)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for life.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully commit an act against a per-
son who was a member of (name or description of the national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group), with the intent to take part in a plan to de-
stroy such group in whole or in part, to wit: [willfully kill (name or
description of person)] [(cause serious bodily or mental harm to (name or
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description of person)] [deliberately inflict on (name or description of
person) conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruc-
tion of the group in whole or in part] [impose measures on (name or
description of person) intended to prevent births within the group] [forci-
bly transfer a child of the group, (name or description of child), to an-
other group], by means of (description of act or omission).
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
DEFINITION 5: CRiMES AGAINST HUMANITY
5.1 GENERALLY.
Crimes against humanity are serious offenses directed against per-
sons as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds.
Thus, isolated offenses have not been considered as crimes against hu-
manity, and crimes against humanity require proof that the acts alleged
resulted from some systematic action.
There is considerable overlap between these offenses and genocide,
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws or
customs of war. The possible victims of crimes against humanity consti-
tute a wider class than those who are capable of being made the objects
of these other offense, and may include fellow-citizens of the person
committing the offense as well as stateless persons. Although both are di-
rected against a specific group, crimes against humanity can be distin-
guished from genocide in that they do not require an intent to destroy the
group, only proof that the act was part of a widespread or systematic at-
tack against a civilian population on national, political, ethnical, racial, or
religious grounds. Conviction of these offenses requires proof of the un-
derlying elements.
5.2 MURDER.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That a certain named or described person is dead;
(2) That the death resulted from the act or omission of the
accused;
(3) That the killing was unlawful; and,
(4) That, at the time of the killing, the accused had the intent to
kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a person; and,
(5) That the act or omission was part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack against a civilian population on national, political, ethnical,
racial, or religious grounds.
(B) Comment. This Definition differs from Definition 2.2, willful
killing, in two important respects. First, this offense does not require that
the victim was protected under one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions. Second, this offense does require the additional element that the act
or omission was part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civil-
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ian population on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
For this reason, willful killing is a lesser included offense of this
Definition.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Willful killing. (See Definition 2.2)
(3) Inhuman treatment, including biological experiments. (See
Definition 2.4)
(4) Willfully causing great suffering. (See Definition 2.5)
(5) Causing serious injury to body or health. (See Definition
2.6)
(6) Rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced
prostitution. (See Definition 5.8)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for life.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), with the intent to kill or inflict great
bodily harm upon some person, unlawfully kill (name or description of
person), by means of (description of act or omission), as a part of a
(widespread) (systematic) attack against (description of the civilian popu-
lation) on (national) (political) (ethnical) (racial) (religious) grounds.
(F) Closely related offenses.
(1) Torture. (See Definition 2.3)
(2) Extermination. (See Definition 5.3)
(3) Torture and mutilation. (See Definition 5.7)
5.3 EXTERMINATION.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused committed an act or omission against a
certain named or described person;
(2) That such person was a member of a national, ethnical, ra-
cial, or religious group;
(3) That the accused committed such act or omission with the
intent to take part in a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds;
and,
(4) That the act or omission was unlawful and one of the
following:
(a) Willful killing;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm;
(c) Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to
bring about the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; or,
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(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
(B) Comment. This offense is identical to the offense of genocide
specifically defined as "killing members of the group," except that this
offense requires proof that the offense was part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack against a civilian population on national, political, ethnical,
racial, or religious grounds, not intent to destroy the group. The genesis
of the Genocide Convention were the crimes against humanity. Specifi-
cally, the extermination of racial and religious minorities by the Nazis
during World War II. Thus, "extermination" is essentially the same as
genocide, with the intent to destroy a particular group.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Willful killing. (See Definition 2.2)
(3) Murder. (See Definition 5.2)
(4) Enslavement. (See Definition 5.4)
(5) Deportation. (See Definition 5.5)
(6) Imprisonment. (See Definition 5.6)
(7) Torture and mutilation. (See Definition 5.7)
(8) Rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced
prostitution. (See Definition 5.8)
(9) Persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds.
(See Definition 5.9)
(10) Other inhumane acts. (See Definition 5.10)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for life.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully commit an act against a per-
son who was a member of (name or description of the national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group), with the intent to take part in a (widespread)
(systematic) attack against (description of the civilian population) on (na-
tional) (political) (ethnical) (racial) (religious) grounds, to wit: [willfully
kill (name or description of person)] [(cause serious bodily or mental
harm to (name or description of person)] [deliberately inflict on (name or
description of person) conditions of life calculated to bring about the
physical destruction of the group in whole or in part] [impose measures
on (name or description of person) intended to prevent births within the
group] [forcibly transfer a child of the group, (name or description of
child), to another group], by means of (description of act or omission).
(F) Closely related offenses. Genocide. (See Definition 4.2)
5.4 ENSLAVEMENT.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused held a person against that person's will;
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(2) That the accused did so willfully and unlawfully;
(3) That the accused coerced the person to perform labor incon-
sistent with that allowed under international law; and,
(4) That the offense was part of a widespread or systematic at-
tack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnical, racial
or religious grounds.
(B) Comment. This offense essentially requires a showing that the
accused willfully held another person for the purpose of performing la-
bor. Key considerations here are, first, that the restraint imposed must
have been wrongful or unlawful. This eliminates from prosecution cases
in which persons are captured during battle and confined prior to or after
a determination of their prisoner of war status. Second, that the labor
performed must be inconsistent with international law recognizes those
situations, like POW labor, that are provided for in such conventions as
the Geneva Conventions.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)(2) Unlawful deportation or transfer, or unlawful confinement
of a civilian. (See Definition 2.10)
(3) Taking civilians as hostages. (See Definition 2.11)
(4) Imprisonment. (See Definition 5.6)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for ten years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and willfully held (name or
description of person) against (his) (her) will, and coerced (him) (her) to
perform labor which exceeded that allowed by international law, as a part
of a (widespread) (systematic) attack against (description of the civilian
population) on (national) (political) (ethnical) (racial) (religious) grounds,
to wit: (name or description of act or omission).
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
5.5 DEPORTATION.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused unlawfully expelled a person from the ter-
ritory of the State in which that person resides;
(2) That the accused knew the inhabitant's status as lawful resi-
dent of the territory;
(3) That the deportation was not conducted as an evacuation for
safety or any other lawful reason; and,
(4) That the expulsion was part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnical, ra-
cial, or religious grounds.
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(B) Comment. This offense requires an expulsion of persons from
territory occupied by the accused. A key point is that the expulsion must
be unlawful; it must be part of an attack against the civilian population
or defined subgroup. Movement of civilians for safety or other legitimate
purposes during war is permitted. This offense should not be construed
so broadly as to impair an armed force's ability to protect the indigenous
population.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Unlawful deportation or transfer of a civilian. (See Defini-
tion 2.10)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for ten years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully deport (name or description
of person), from the territory known by the accused to be the person's
lawful residence, by means of (description of act or omission), as a part
of a (widespread) (systematic) attack against (description of the civilian
population) on (national) (political) (ethnical) (racial) (religious) grounds.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
5.6 IMPRISONMENT.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused unlawfully held, confined, or otherwise re-
strained the liberty of a person;
(2) That such restraint was effected without affording the proce-
dural and substantive protections prescribed in the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention (1949); and,
(3) That such restraint was part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnical, ra-
cial, or religious grounds.
(B) Comment. This nature of this offense is the restraint, without
due process or the intent to provide due process, of a person as part of a
campaign to attack a civilian population or any subgroup. This offense
does not reach situations in which civilians are imprisoned or otherwise
restrained as a result of offenses they have committed or prior to a pris-
oner of war determination. An example of such an offense is the place-
ment of civilian groups in concentration camps as was done by the Nazis
to racial and religious minorities during World War II. The word "unlaw-
fully" is used in the first element in recognition of the fact that during
armed conflicts, occupying powers may intern civilians "for imperative
reasons of security" or safety. Article 78, 1949 Geneva Convention (IV).
Such restrictions on liberty are, of course, lawful.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
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(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Unlawful confinement of a civilian. (See Definition 2.10)
(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for five years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully confine (name or description
of person), by means of (description of act or omission), without the pro-
cedural and substantive protections prescribed by the Fourth Geneva
Convention (1949), as a part of a (widespread) (systematic) attack against
(description of the civilian population) on (national) (political) (ethnical)
(racial) (religious) grounds.
(F) Closely related offenses. Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or
a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial. (See Definition 2.9)
5.7 TORTURE AND MUTILATION.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) Torture.
(a) That the accused committed an act resulting in the in-
fliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon a certain
named or described person;
(b) That the accused, at the time of such act, had the spe-
cific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering;
(c) That the torture was inflicted for such purposes as ob-
taining from the immediate victim or a third person information or a con-
fession, punishing him or her for an act he or a third person committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
her, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind;
(d) That the torture is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person act-
ing in an official capacity;
(e) That the pain or suffering did not arise only from or
was inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions; and,
(f) That the act or omission was part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population on national, political, eth-
nical, racial, or religious grounds.
(2) Mutilation.
(a) That the accused committed a certain act or omission
upon a certain named or described person;
(b) That the accused thereby unlawfully caused serious in-
jury upon the person;
(c) That the accused, at the time, intended to cause serious
injury upon the person;
(d) That this injury seriously disfigured the person's body;
and,
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(e) That the act or omission was part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population on national, political, eth-
nical, racial, or religious grounds.
(B) Comment.
(1) Generally. These elements of torture derive from the Con-
vention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, UNGA Res. 39/46 (1987). The impetus of this of-
fense is the infliction of pain or injury for certain listed purposes. Serious
injury to body or health is not an element of torture. If serious injury re-
sults from the torture, a separate offense should be charged. The force
used in inflicting the pain or suffering upon the victim may have been
directly or indirectly applied. Great suffering not only includes injury to
body or physical health, but also severe pain and mental anguish.
(2) Mutilation. Mutilation includes any serious injury that dis-
figures the body. Unlike the offense of willfully causing great suffering
or torture, this offense requires that physical injury actually have been in-
flicted. The offense is complete if such an injury is inflicted even though
there is a possibility that the victim may eventually recover the use of
that part of his or her body injured. Mutilation is an aggravated form of
serious injury characterized by disfigurement of the body. Intent suffi-
cient to constitute this offense may be to injure and not necessarily to in-
flict serious injury or mutilate. When serious injury has been inflicted by
means of intentionally using force in a manner likely to achieve that re-
sult, it may be inferred that serious injury and mutilation was intended.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Torture.
(a) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(b) Torture. (See Definition 2.3)
(c) Inhuman treatment, including biological experiments.
(See Definition 2.4)
(d) Willfully causing great suffering. (See Definition 2.5)
(e) Causing serious injury to body or health. (See Defini-
tion 2.6)
(2) Mutilation.
(a) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(b) Causing serious injury to body or health. (See Defini-
tion 2.6)
(D) Maximum punishment.
(1) Torture. Imprisonment for forty years.
(2) Mutilation. Imprisonment for forty years.
(E) Sample charge.
(1) Torture.
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In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and intentionally torture
(name or description of person), for such purposes of [obtaining from
such person or a third person information or a confession] [punishing
such person for an act he or a third person committed or is suspected of
having committed] [intimidating or coercing such person] [description of
any other reason based on discrimination of any kind], by means of
(description of act or omission), and (at the instigation) (with the consent
or acquiescence) of (description of public official or other person acting
in an official capacity), as a part of a (widespread) (systematic) attack
against (description of the civilian population) on (national) (political)
(ethnical) (racial) (religious) grounds.
(2) Mutilation.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and intentionally mutilate
(name or description of person), by means of (description of act or omis-
sion), as a part of a (widespread) (systematic) attack against (description
of the civilian population) on (national) (political) (ethnical) (racial) (re-
ligious) grounds.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
5.8 RAPE AND OTHER FORMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, INCLUDING ENFORCED
PROSTITUTION.
(A) Elements of the offenses.
(1) Rape.
(a) That the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse
or forcible sodomy with a person;
(b) That the act of sexual intercourse or forcible sodomy
was done unlawfully by force and without consent; and,
(c) That the act was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
(2) Sexual assault.
(a) That the accused, with unlawful force or violence, in-
flicted bodily harm of a sexual nature on a person; and,
(b) That the act was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
(3) Enforced prostitution.
(a) That the accused unlawfully coerced a person to engage
in sexual acts with another; and,
(b) That the act of coercion was committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on na-
tional, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
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(B) Comment. This offense differs from the classic offense of rape
in that it requires the additional element that it be part of a campaign to
attack the civilian population or a subgroup. Modification of this offense
to include "other forms of sexual assault, including enforced prostitu-
tion" is based on language found throughout various UN Security Coun-
cil Resolutions denouncing the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and in the
Report of the Secretary General proposing the Tribunal Statute. Such uni-
versal condemnation of "ethnic cleansing" is sufficient to place potential
offenders on notice that the acts thus defined are unlawful as a matter of
international law. The offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a person
by force and without his or her consent. This includes forcible sodomy.
For either offense, any penetration of the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of
a person with the accused's sexual organ is sufficient to complete the of-
fense. Forced intercourse or sodomy with a third person or animal is also
contemplated by this offense. For both offenses, force and lack of con-
sent are required. The lack of consent required is more than mere lack of
acquiescence. If a person in possession of his or her mental and physical
faculties fails to make his or her lack of consent reasonably manifest by
taking such measures of resistance as are called for by the circumstances,
the inference may be drawn that he or she did consent. Consent, how-
ever, may not be inferred if resistance would have been futile, where re-
sistance is overcome by threats of death or great bodily harm, or where
the victim is unable to resist because of the lack of mental or physical
faculties. In such a case there is no consent and the force involved in
penetration will suffice. All the surrounding circumstances are to be con-
sidered in determining whether a person gave his or her consent, or
whether he or she failed or ceased to resist only because of a reasonable
fear of death or serious injury. If there is actual consent, although ob-
tained by fraud, the act is not rape, but if to the accused's knowledge the
person is of unsound mind or unconscious to an extent rendering him or
her incapable of giving consent, the act is rape.
(C) Lesser included offenses.
(1) Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(2) Willfully causing great suffering. (See Definition 2.5)
(D) Maximum punishment.
(1) Rape. Imprisonment for life.
(2) Sexual assault. Imprisonment for life.
(3) Enforced prostitution. Imprisonment for life.
(E) Sample charge.
(1) Rape.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), (rape) (unlawfully commit an act of sod-
omy upon) (name or description of person), by means of (description of
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act or omission), as a part of a (widespread) (systematic) attack against
(description of the civilian population) on (national) (political) (ethnical)
(racial) (religious) grounds.
(2) Sexual assault.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), inflict bodily harm of a sexual nature
upon (name or description of person), by means of (description of act or
omission), as a part of a (widespread) (systematic) attack against
(description of the civilian population) on (national) (political) (ethnical)
(racial) (religious) grounds.
(3) Enforced prostitution.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully coerce (name or description
of person) to engage in sexual acts with others, by means of (description
of act or omission), as a part of a (widespread) (systematic) attack
against (description of the civilian population) on (national) (political)
(ethnical) (racial) (religious) grounds.
(F) Closely related offenses. None.
5.9 PERSECUTIONS ON POLITICAL, RACIAL, AND RELIGIOUS GROUNDS.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) That the accused committed an act or omission against a
certain named or described person;
(2) That the act or omission was intended to harass, cause suf-
fering, of otherwise limit the human rights or fundamental freedoms of
such person;
(3) That the act was unlawful in that it was not authorized by
one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and,
(4) That the act or omission was part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethni-
cal, racial, or religious grounds.
(B) Comment. The second element of this offense is based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 10, 1948. The intent of this Definition is
to proscribe those acts of persecution that are not legitimate methods of
controlling a civilian population authorized under the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions. Although the prohibited acts described may appear to include
those of a fairly minor nature, the fourth element ensures that only seri-
ous acts of persecutions are included in this Definition. This Definition
includes, for example, the act of being a prison guard of a concentration
camp that is not authorized by one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, but was part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civil-
ian population on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
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(D) Maximum punishment. Imprisonment for ten years.
(E) Sample charge.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and intentionally persecute
(name or description of person), by means of (description of act or omis-
sion), as a part of a (widespread) (systematic) attack against (description
of the civilian population) on (national) (political) (ethnical) (racial) (re-
ligious) grounds.
(F) Closely related offenses. Outrages upon personal dignity, in par-
ticular humiliating and degrading treatment. (See Definition 5.10)
5.10 OTHER INHUMANE ACTS.
(A) Elements of the offense.
(1) Taking of hostages.
(a) That the accused seized or detained a certain named or
described person, or committed some other act or omission which re-
sulted in a certain named or described person being held hostage;
(b) That the act or omission was unlawful in that it ex-
ceeded that allowed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and,
(c) That the act or omission was part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
(2) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment.
(a) That the accused committed a certain act or omission
against a certain named or described person;
(b) That the act or omission was an outrage upon the per-
sonal dignity of, or was particularly humiliating and degrading treatment
toward, such person;
(c) That the act or omission was unlawful in that it ex-
ceeded that allowed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and,
(d) That the act or omission was part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
(3) The passing of sentence and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensa-
ble by civilized peoples.
(a) That the accused executed, confined, or otherwise pun-
ished a certain named or described person within his control or authority;
(b) That such act or omission was unlawful in that it ex-
ceeded that allowed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions;
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(c) That the act or omission was performed without first ac-
cording the person a fair and regular trial as defined by the Third or
Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949;
(d) That the accused intended to deprive the person of such
fair and regular trial; and,
(e) That the act or omission was part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
(B) Comment. Article 5(i) of the Tribunal Statute makes criminal
those "other inhumane acts" that rise to the level of being crimes against
humanity. It is clear from the text of the Tribunal Statute that this provi-
sion should capture those crimes against humanity which are not other-
wise identified in article 5 of the Tribunal Statute. This Definition is in-
tended to capture those offenses not enumerated within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. If any offense is specifically made punishable by another
Definition, it should be charged as a violation of that Definition. The lan-
guage of article 5 of the Tribunal Statute is derived from Control Council
Law No. 10, article fl(1)(c). Having thus been defined, there is no ques-
tion but that these offenses are part of customary international law and,
therefore, consistent with the principle of nullen crimen sine lege. As an
illustration of those offenses included in this definition, paragraphs (A)(1)
through (A)(3) are listed. These three examples are derived from com-
mon article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but should not be consid-
ered as an exhaustive list of offenses which can be charged under this
Definition.
(C) Lesser included offenses. Attempt. (See Definition 1.2)
(D) Maximum punishment.
(1) Taking of hostages. Imprisonment for five years.
(2) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment. Imprisonment for five years.
(3) The passing of sentence and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensa-
ble by civilized peoples. Imprisonment for five years.
(E) Sample charge.
(1) Taking of hostages.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and willfully held (name or
description of person) against (his) (her) will, as a part of a (widespread)
(systematic) attack against (description of the civilian population) on (na-
tional) (political) (ethnical) (racial) (religious) grounds.
(2) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment.
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In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and willfully (commit an out-
rage upon the personal dignity of) (humiliate and degrade) (name or
description of person), by means of (description of act or omission), as a
part of a (widespread) (systematic) attack against (description of the ci-
vilian population) on (national) (political) (ethnical) (racial) (religious)
grounds.
(3) The passing of sentence and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensa-
ble by civilized peoples.
In that (name of accused) did, at (location of act or omission), on or
about (date of act or omission), unlawfully and intentionally (pass sen-
tence) (carry out the execution) of (name or description of person), by
means of (description of act or omission), without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees of a fair and regular trial prescribed by the Third or Fourth
Geneva Conventions (1949), as a part of a (widespread) (systematic) at-
tack against (description of the civilian population) on (national) (politi-
cal) (ethnical) (racial) (religious) grounds.
(F) Closely related offenses.
(1) Taking of hostages. Taking civilians as hostages. (See Defi-
nition 2.11)
(2) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment. Persecutions on political, racial, and religious
grounds. (See Definition 5.9)
(3) The passing of sentence and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensa-
ble by civilized peoples.
(a) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the
rights of fair and regular trial. (See Definition 2.9)
(b) Unlawful confinement of a civilian. (See Definition
2.10)
DEFINITION 6: AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
6.1 GENERALLY.
Any defense may be raised by evidence presented by the defense,
the prosecution, or the Tribunal. Placing upon the prosecution the burden
of proving that the defense did not exist is in keeping with its burden of
proving that the accused committed the crime charged.
6.2 BURDEN OF PROOF.
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Once a defense under these rules is placed in issue by some evidence,
the prosecution shall have the burden of proving beyond reasonable
doubt that the defense did not exist.
6.3 PERSONS IN POSITIONS OF SUPERIOR AUTHORITY.
It is a defense to any offense that the accused, who is a person in a
position of superior authority charged as a principal pursuant to Defini-
tion 1.1(B)(2), did not know or that a person of ordinary sense and un-
derstanding should not have known that his or her subordinates were
about to commit or had committed crimes, or that the accused did take
the necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or halt the commission of
such crimes or to punish the offenders.
6.4 PERSONS ACTING PURSUANT TO SUPERIOR ORDERS.
It is a defense to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant
to orders unless the accused knew the orders to be unlawful or a person
of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be
unlawful.
COMMENTARY
Although article 7 of the Tribunal Statute broadly states "the fact
that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of
a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment . . . " it is a long-standing prac-
tice, dating from the Nuremberg "subsequent proceedings," that under
some circumstances there is a legitimate defense of obedience to superior
orders. This Definition recognizes the defense of superior orders in ac-
cordance with international law. In order to be effective, however, the ac-
cused must neither have subjective or objective knowledge of the supe-
rior order's unlawfulness.
6.5 DURESS OR COERCION.
It is a defense to any offense except any crime involving killing that
the accused's participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable ap-
prehension that the accused or another innocent person would be imme-
diately killed or would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the ac-
cused did not commit the act. The Tribunal may consider, as a matter of
mitigation in offenses involving killing, the extent to which the accused
was compelled by duress to commit the crime.
COMMENTARY
This rule is an expression of the principle, common in many legal
systems, that duress should also be considered in mitigation of punish-
ment. This principle is applied, in one context, to narrow the effect of an
imperfect obedience to superior orders defense. Even if the accused knew
1999]
74 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
or should have known that the orders he or she was given were unlawful,
it remains a matter for the Tribunal to consider in mitigation that the ac-
cused committed offenses while under duress.
6.6 IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF FACT.
It is a defense that the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mis-
take, an incorrect belief of the true circumstances such that, if the cir-
cumstances were as the accused believed them, the accused would not be
guilty of the offense. The ignorance or mistake must have been reasona-
ble under all the circumstances.
COMMENTARY
This defense is particularly important in armed conflict where the
"fog of war" sometimes clouds the true nature of a situation. For exam-
ple, a reasonable mistake of fact that an object is a legitimate military
target should not lead to prosecution or, if it does, should allow a
defense.
Proposed
DEFINITION OF OFFENSES
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW COMMITTED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
TABLE OF MAXIMUM PUNISHMENTS
(All punishments, except for "life," reflect the number of years of
imprisonment.)
Definition 1: Principals, attempts, and conspiracies
1.2 A ttem pts .......................................................... 20
(Any person found guilty of an attempt under this Definition shall
be subject to the same maximum punishment authorized for the commis-
sion of the offense attempted, except that in no case shall imprisonment
exceeding twenty years be adjudged.)
1.3 C onspiracies ...................................................... 20
(Any person found guilty of conspiracy under this Definition shall
be subject to the same maximum punishment authorized for the commis-
sion of the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, except that in
no case shall imprisonment exceeding twenty years be adjudged.)
DEFINITION 2: GRAVE BREACHES OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
2.2 Willful killing life
2.3 Torture ............................................................ 40
2.4 Inhuman treatment, including biological experiments
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(1) Biological experimentation life
(2) Other inhuman treatment .................................. 20
2.5 Willfully causing great suffering
(1) Rape or forcible sodomy life
(2) Other acts causing great suffering ....................... 40
2.6 Causing serious injury to body or health
(1) M aim ing ..................................................... 40
(2) Willfully causing serious injury .......................... 10
2.7 Extensive destruction or appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly
(1) Extensive destruction ...................................... 40
(2) Extensive appropriation .................................... 20
2.8 Compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in
the forces of a hostile power 10
2.9 Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of
the rights of fair and regular trial 5
2.10 Unlawful deportation or transfer, or unlawful
confinement of a civilian
(1) Unlawful deportation or transfer ......................... 10
(2) Unlawful confinement ..................................... 5
2.11 Taking civilians as hostages ................................... 5
DEFINITION 3: VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR
3.2 Employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering .................. 20
3.3 Wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity ............. 20
3.4 Attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings ...... 20
3.5 Seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education,
the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of
art and science 20
3.6 Plunder of public or private property ....................... 10
3.7 Other violations of the laws or customs of war ........... 10
DEFINITION 4: GENOCIDE
4.2 Genocide lifeDEFHTION 5: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
5.2 Murder life
5.3 Extermination life
5.4 Enslavem ent ...................................................... 10
5.5 D eportation ....................................................... 10
5.6 Im prisonm ent .................................................... 5
5.7 Torture and mutilation
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(1) Torture ........................................................ 40
(2) M utilation .................................................... 40
5.8 Rape and other forms of sexual assault, including
enforced prostitution
(1) Rape life
(2) Sexual assault and enforced prostitution life
5.9 Persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds
10
5.10 Other inhumane acts ............................................ 5
